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TRANSATLANTIC TRADE DISPUTES ON HEALTH, 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ANIMAL WELFARE STANDARDS: 
BACKGROUND TO REGULATORY DIVERGENCE AND 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Tamara Perišin*
Summary: The paper analyses the pattern and background of trans-
atlantic trade disputes where the US and Canada have challenged EU 
health, environmental or animal welfare. It shows that, in principle, 
the EU maintains stricter (or arguably higher) standards in these ar-
eas, partly due to some historic events or societal characteristics which 
make Europeans more risk averse, and partly due to the nature of 
the EU supranational regulatory process. The paper examines whether 
and how the currently negotiated agreements, CETA and TTIP, could 
address this regulatory divergence. It argues that the regulatory dif-
ferences which reflect the different values of two constituencies are 
worth maintaining so as to foster pluralism, diversity, experimenta-
tion and democracy. In contrast, regulatory differences caused by the 
mere fact that regulators work independently of one another should be 
eliminated so as to achieve the benefits of greater trade liberalisation.
1. Introduction
The European Union (EU), the United States (US) and Canada belong 
to the same cultural circle and subscribe to similar values. In principle, 
they are all interested in achieving a high level of protection of health, en-
vironment and animal welfare, and this is visible in their regulatory and 
deregulatory activities. However, particular trade disputes show differ-
ent levels of commitment to a particular value and different levels of risk 
aversion. While regulatory differences were already visible in disputes 
which arose before the establishment of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1995 (such as Tuna/Dolphin where the EU challenged US rules 
on marine management1), since the establishment of the WTO the US 
and Canada have significantly more frequently challenged EU measures 
with high standards of protection than vice versa. The focus of this paper 
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1 GATT Panel Report, US - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (3 September 1991) DS21/R - 
39S/155, unadopted; GATT Panel Report (16 June 1994) DS29/R, unadopted (hereinafter: 
Tuna/Dolphin I; II).
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is on the transatlantic trade disputes where the US or Canada has chal-
lenged EU measures entailing environmental, health or animal welfare 
(moral) standards. 
This paper has three main parts. The first main part looks at the 
number and type of transatlantic trade disputes to show a pattern, and 
areas where the EU standards have been stricter. The second one in-
quires into the reasons behind regulatory divergence which leads to dis-
putes against the EU. The third main part examines ways of address-
ing this regulatory divergence, including under the currently negotiated 
agreements, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The pa-
per argues that regulatory divergence which is a consequence of the true 
legitimate aims of different constituencies is one worth keeping so as to 
maintain a democratic system and to keep the advantages of diversity, 
pluralism and experimentation. In contrast, regulatory differences which 
are the mere accidental consequence of the fact that regulators work 
independently of one another should be eliminated to achieve the advan-
tages of trade liberalisation. The method of removing non-tariff barriers 
to trade should be sensitive to the distinction between these two types 
regulatory diversity.
2. Trade disputes challenging EU’s strict health, environmental or 
animal welfare standards 
The number and substance of transatlantic trade disputes show that 
disputes initiated by the US or Canada against the EU are of a very dif-
ferent type from those going in the other direction.2 Disputes against the 
EU frequently entail challenges of a regulatory standard having a health, 
environmental or animal welfare aspect, while the same is never true of 
disputes which the EU starts against the US or Canada. 
First, concerning EU – US trade disputes, since the establishment of 
the WTO there has been a total of 51 trade dispute, but many have never 
reached the stage of Panel proceedings so they are not of interest to this 
paper. Some 32 disputes were initiated by the EU against the US, and 15 
of those reached the Panel report (14 were appealed so they reached the 
Appellate Body (AB) report). A total of 19 disputes were initiated by the 
US against the EU, and 8 of those reached the Panel report (4 went up on 
appeal and led to an AB report). 
2 For an overview of all disputes see, WTO, Map of Disputes Between WTO 
Members<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm?country 
selected=EEC&sense=e> accessed 28 June 2014.
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More interesting than the number of these cases is their substance. 
Namely, cases brought by the EU against the US mostly concerned anti-
dumping, subsidies, intellectual property, and there were no cases where 
the EU challenged a US high regulatory standard on the basis of the 
TBT or SPS agreements (even Art III:4 GATT was never the cornerstone 
of an EU claim, but was merely mentioned alongside other claims which 
were more relevant for particular cases). In contrast, among the decided 
cases brought by the US against the EU, there were two complaints, EC 
– hormones3 and EC – Biotech,4 that argued that an EU regulatory stand-
ard was, inter alia, contrary to the SPS and TBT. In EC – hormones, the 
object of the attack was the EU ban of meat and meat products derived 
from cattle which, for growth promotion purposes, had been treated with 
certain natural or synthetic hormones. In EC – Biotech, the challenge was 
directed against EU rules on genetically modified organisms. The EU lost 
both cases as its measures were found to be contrary to the SPS.
There is another pending case, EC – Poultry, where the US is chal-
lenging an EU regulatory standard as contrary to the TBT and SPA.5 The 
case concerns the EU ban on poultry meat treated with certain chemical 
substances used in the US. A Panel was established, but not yet com-
posed.
Second, concerning EU – Canada trade disputes, there has been a 
total of 15 disputes, again several not reaching the stage of Panel pro-
ceedings. A total of 6 disputes were initiated by the EU against Canada, 
and 4 of those reached the stage of a Panel report (and 3 led to an AB 
report). Some 9 disputes were initiated by Canada against the EU, and 4 
of those were decided by the WTO dispute settlement bodies leading to 4 
Panel reports (and 3 to AB reports).
Again, if one looks at the substance of the decided disputes, one will 
see that the EU challenged Canadian measures on the basis of the sub-
sidies agreement, TRIPS, TRIMs etc, but there has been no case where 
it challenged a regulatory standard in the field of health, environment 
or animal welfare. By contrast, all of the disputes that Canada initiated 
against the EU, EC – hormones, EC – Asbestos,6 EC – Biotech and EC – 
Seals,7 entailed a challenge of a regulatory standard concerning health, 
3 WTO, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (hormones), Report of the Ap-
pellate Body (16 January 1998) WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R. 
4 WTO, EC – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, Panel 
Reports (29 September 2006) WT/DS291-293/R.
5 WTO, EC — Certain Measures Affecting Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat Products from the 
US, Request for Consultations by the US (20 January 2009) WT/DS389/1.
6 WTO, EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Report of the 
Appellate Body (12 March 2001), WT/DS135/AB/R.
7 WTO, EC — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, Report 
of the Appellate Body (22 May 2014) WT/DS400&401/AB/R.
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environment or animal welfare, which Canada saw as contrary to the 
GATT, TBT and/or SPS. In EC – hormones and EC – Biotech, Canada’s 
complaint was parallel to those of the US (above) dealing with rules on 
beef-hormones and GMOs, respectively.  In EC – Asbestos, Canada chal-
lenged an EU Member State decree prohibiting the manufacture, sale, 
import, export, transfer, etc of all asbestos fibres and of all asbestos prod-
ucts. And most recently, in EC – Seals, Canada challenged the EU ban on 
seal products. The EU was found to be in breach of WTO in all of these 
cases, except in EC – Asbestos.
There is also a number of transatlantic trade disputes that arose out-
side the WTO, in other international and supranational fora, and that 
could reach the WTO dispute settlement process at some stage. For ex-
ample, a WTO dispute could arise concerning EU rules on aviation emis-
sions.8 Several years ago, a number of US airline companies decided to 
take to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) a case against the EU Avia-
tion Emissions Directive aimed at environmental protection by requiring 
the purchase of emissions allowances for all flights to and from the EU 
(including for emissions which do not occur over EU territory, but instead 
over, for example, US territory or the open seas).9 These companies lost 
the case, but they have continued exerting pressure on their government 
to resolve the issue in other available fora, such as the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO)10 or the WTO.11 Similarly, battles for a regu-
latory standard are happening with the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
The most striking example concerns the additive, ractopamine. The EU 
bans the use of ractopamine as animal feed, and bans meat containing 
its residues, while this additive is in common use in the US and Canada. 
Despite the EU’s opposition, the Codex Alimentarius Commission ap-
proved minimal residues of this substance in meat, with a controversial 
vote of 69-67, and 7 abstentions.12 
8 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 
2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community [2009] OJ L8/3.
9 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America v Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change, judgment of 21 December 2011.
10 An agreement was reached at the last ICAO General Assembly that the ICAO would start 
developing a global system of market-based measures. ICAO Resolution A38-18: Consoli-
dated statement of continuing ICAO policies and practices related to environmental protec-
tion – Climate change, November 2013, particularly Art 19.
11 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, ‘EU Aviation Emissions 
Levy Ruled Lawful by European Court as Measure Enters into Force’ (2011) 16(1) Bridges 
Weekly Trade News Digest <http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/123063/> accessed 
28 June 2014.
12 EU Press Release Database, ‘Codex Alimentarius: Statement by the EU on Ractopa-
mine’, News from the European Commission’s Midday Briefing <europa.eu/rapid/midday-
express-06-07-2012.htm> accessed 3 April 2014; A Alemanno and G Capodieci, ‘Testing 
the Limits of Global Food Governance: The Case of Ractopamine’ (2012) 3 European Jour-
nal of Risk Regulation <ssrn.com/abstract=2133908> accessed 3 April 2014.
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Similar cases concerning the EU’s comparatively stricter standards 
frequently appear on the horizon, eg those concerning meat of the off-
spring of cloned animals,13 apples treated with DPA to prevent storage 
scald,14 nano-ingredients in foods,15 etc. Some of those might get ad-
dressed through the diplomatic, political process and others might lead 
to judicial disputes.
3. Reasons for regulatory divergence 
As a general rule, regulatory divergence happens as an incidental 
consequence of the fact that regulators in different countries work inde-
pendently of each other so they come up with different regulatory solu-
tions. In most cases, regulatory divergence is not a consequence of en-
trenched values or different views, but is merely accidental. However, a 
pattern of disputes between the EU, on the one hand, and the US and 
Canada, on the other hand, shows that their regulatory differences in 
the field of health, environmental and animal welfare are not accidental, 
but that the EU has a policy of adopting relatively stricter standards than 
the US or Canada. There are two possible groups of reasons for this: the 
first are connected to European society and history, and the second are 
connected to the specific regulatory process in the EU as a supranational 
organisation.
3.1. Societal and historic reasons
Societies and values are formed over centuries, but it can also take 
only one important event to change them. It is sometimes argued that the 
long history of the European continent makes Europeans more reliant on 
tradition.16 There are indeed some examples of this. In the area of food 
13 European Parliament, ‘EU Countries Reject EP Call for Labelling of Clone-derived Food’, 
29 March 2011 <www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-PRESS&reference=20
110324STO16430&secondRef=0&language=EN> accessed 3 April 2014; European Parlia-
ment News, ‘Parliament issues urgent call to regulate cloned foods’ 11 May 2011 <www.
europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20110506IPR18894/html/Parliament-
issues-urgent-call-to-regulate-cloned-foods> accessed 3 April 2014; Council of the EU, 
‘Novel Foods: Statement of the Council’s Legal Service’ 17 May 2011, 10332/11, PRESSE 
140 <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/lsa/122071.pdf> 
accessed 3 April 2014.
14 Tom Philpott, ‘American Apples Just Got Banned in Europe’ (24 April 2014) Mother 
Jones <http://www.motherjones.com/tom-philpott/2014/04/europe-just-banned-apples-
you-eat> accessed 28 June 2014.
15 Euractiv, ‘Parliament Rejects Draft EU Law Allowing Nanomaterials in Food’, 12 March 
2014 <www.euractiv.com/health/parliament-opposes-commission-na-news-534093> ac-
cessed 3 April 2014.
16 Marsha A Echols ‘Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and the United States: 
Different Cultures, Different Laws’ (1998) 4 Columbia Journal of European Law 525, 528; 
David Vogel, ‘The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and Envi-
ronmental Regulation in Europe’ (2003) 33 British Journal of Political Science 557, 562.
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standards, Europeans consider many traditional types of food produc-
tion as safe, and even especially endorse it while Americans fear them. 
In Europe, the ‘safety [of traditional food products] is assumed based on 
centuries of experience rather than on laboratory science’.17 For example, 
the use of unpasteurised milk in food production is explicitly permitted 
in EU legislation18 and several unpasteurised cheeses such as Brie, Cam-
embert, Roquefort, Feta, etc, are even seen as champions of European 
quality, having the protected designation of origin.19 In the US, cheese 
made with unpasteurised milk is seen as unsafe20 and is prohibited un-
less it has been aged for 60 days.21 In contrast, European consumers are 
reluctant to accept the new technologies of producing foods. Eurobarom-
eter reports show that Europeans are worried about hormone residues in 
meats,22 genetically modified foods,23 the meat of cloned animals24, and 
the majority have never heard of nanotechnology.25 Their concerns are 
reflected in strict regulation. In contrast, in the US some opinion polls do 
show concerns about these food productions,26 but these have not been 
reflected in regulation.
17 Echols (n 16) 528.
18 Council Directive 92/46/EEC of 16 June 1992 laying down the health rules for the pro-
duction and placing on the market of raw milk, heat-treated milk and milk-based products 
[1992] OJ L268/1; Council Directive 94/71/EC of 13 December 1994 amending Directive 
92/46/EEC laying down the health rules for the production and placing on the market of 
raw milk, heat- treated milk and milk-based products [1994] OJ L368/33. See on this point 
Echols (n 16) 530-533.
19 For a list of protected designations of origin, geographical indications and guaran-
teed traditional specialties, see EU Database of Origin and Registration (DOOR) <http://
ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html> accessed 28 June 2014. 
20 US Food and Drug Administration, ‘The Dangers of Raw Milk: Unpasteurized Milk Can 
Pose a Serious Health Risk’ <http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodborneIllnessCon-
taminants/UCM239493.pdf> accessed 28 June 2014.
21 US Food and Drug Administration, Code of Federal Regulations, 21 CFR Sec 1240.61 
‘Mandatory pasteurization for all milk and milk products in final package form intended 
for direct human consumption’ (Revised 1 April 2014); Code of Federal Regulations, 7 CFR 
58.439 Cheese from unpasteurized milk ! January 2004).
22 Commission, Special Eurobarometer, Risk Issues (2006) 20.
23 ibid 24.
24 Commission, Flash Eurobarometer, Europeans’ Attitudes towards Animal Cloning, 
Analytical Report (2008) 20.
25 Commission, Special Eurobarometer, Biotechnology Report (2010) 33.
26 Eg American concerns about hormones and GMOs have been recorded in Yun-Jae 
Hwang, Brian Roe, Mario F Teisl, ‘An Empirical Analysis of United States Consumers’ Con-
cerns About Eight Food Production and Processing Technologies’ (2005) 8(1) AgBioForum 
– The Journal of Agrobiotechnology Management & Economics, Article 6 <http://www.agbi-
oforum.org/v8n1/v8n1a06-roe.htm> accessed 28 June 2014; similarly, American concerns 
about GMOs were also shown on ABC News, ‘Poll: Skepticism of Genetically Modified Foods’ 
(19 June 2013) <http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=97567> accessed 15 July 
2014.
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However, even more than the centuries of tradition, risk regulation 
is influenced by more recent events. This phenomenon where knowledge 
about a recent hazard significantly influences behaviour is what psy-
chology and behavioural law and economics refer to as ‘availability of 
information’.27 There is extensive literature discussing how US regulatory 
standards in the 1960s until the 1980s were stricter than those in the 
EC.28 The tables turned in the 1990s when a number of scandals shook 
Europe, (arguably)29 making Europeans more aware and cautious about 
the risks arising from new technologies, not only in food but in other 
areas as well.30 Particularly salient was the outbreak of the Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease caused by ‘mad cows’ that were infected through feed con-
taining infectious meat and bone meal.31 The outbreak of this disease was 
also poorly managed.32 Relevant authorities and scientists alike not only 
failed to properly warn about this, but were also slow in admitting that 
there was a problem. This and similar scandals33 have made Europeans 
more doubtful about information that is presented as scientific fact, and 
more prone to relying on the precautionary principle. Europeans con-
sider that it takes decades to determine whether a particular technology 
is safe, and are reluctant to accept its risks.
Such relatively recent incidents have shaped European attitudes not 
only towards food safety, but more broadly towards health, environment 
and animal welfare. For example, asbestos had been used for decades 
before its harmful properties were discovered. It is true that the harmful 
properties of asbestos affected not only Europe, but all countries where 
asbestos was used. However, the reaction in Europe, for example in 
France, was to ban asbestos, while Canada, for instance, merely started 
27 Richard H Thaler, Cass R Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about health, Wealth, 
and happiness (Yale University Press 2008); Christine Jolls, Cass R Sunstein and Richard 
Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 
1471, 1518-1519.
28 See eg Vogel (n 16). See also Pamela A Vesilind. ‘Continental Drift: Agricultural Trade 
and the Widening Gap between the European Union and United States Animal Welfare 
Laws’ (2010-11) 12 Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 223, 224-225 on recent food 
safety scandals in the US that triggered new legislation.
29 For an analysis showing that Europe is not more risk averse than the US, but that there 
are opposite examples which can be explained by the context in which a particular risk 
is observed, see Jonathan B Wiener and Michael D Rogers, ‘Comparing Precaution in the 
United States and Europe’ (2002) 5 Journal of Risk Research 317.
30 Katherine O’Neill, ‘Mad Cows and Ailing Hens: The Transatlantic Relationship and Live-
stock Diseases’ (2006) eScholarship, University of European Studies, Berkeley <http://
escholarship.org/uc/item/94f2963j> accessed 28 June 2014.
31 UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, ‘BSE: Disease Control & Eradica-
tion - Causes of BSE’ <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130123162956/http:/
www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/controls-eradication/causes.html> accessed 28 June 2014.
32 O’Neill (n 30) 8.
33 See E Ragnar, DV Löfstedt and D Vogel, ‘The Changing Character of Regulation: A Com-
parison of Europe and the United States’ (2001) 21 Risk Analysis 399, 403.
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using it in a safer way,34 and the US first banned it, but then an appeals 
court struck the ban down35 so nowadays asbestos is not entirely prohib-
ited in the US.36
Europeans are also quite concerned about the environment, and the 
risks posed to it by modern technologies and lifestyle. This has also been 
reflected in regulations. For example, European concerns about GMO 
crops which are not only relevant for human health, but also for environ-
mental balance, have translated into restrictive rules. Similarly, Euro-
peans are very worried about climate change, and rank it as the second 
most serious global problem, preceded only by ‘poverty, hunger and lack 
of drinking water’.37 Europe has been relatively active in adopting meas-
ures addressing climate change, for example through its Emissions Trad-
ing System (ETS). In contrast, in the US there are still influential political 
actors (not only those in the margins) who deny the existence of climate 
change or that it is a consequence of human activity.38
Finally, Europeans have significant concerns about animal welfare,39 
which has translated into a number of measures seeking to protect 
farmed animals through rules on farming,40 transport,41 and slaughter.42 
While these rules are mostly intended to regulate domestic production 
and transport, they still have external effects. For example, due to the 
34 WTO, EC – Asbestos (n 6).
35 Warren E Leary, ‘Appeals Court Strikes Down Major Parts of Federal Asbestos Ban’ New 
York Times (New York 22 October 1991) <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/22/us/appe-
als-court-strikes-down-major-parts-of-federal-asbestos-ban.html> accessed 28 June 2014.
36 See United States Environmental Protection Agency, ‘Asbestos Laws and Regulations’ 
<http://www2.epa.gov/asbestos/asbestos-laws-and-regulations> accessed 28 June 2014.
37 Commission, Special Eurobarometer 372, Climate Change Report (2011) 5-17.
38 See eg a speech by the Congressman Representative Paul Broun, Chairman of the In-
vestigations and Oversight Subcommittee for the House Science, Space, and Technology 
Committee, available at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-moyers/watch-when-con-
gressmen-de_b_4697151.html> accessed 28 June 2014; also Juliet Eilperin, ‘Tea Party 
Republicans Are Biggest Climate Change Deniers, New Pew Poll Finds’ Washington Post 
(Washington DC, 1 November 2013); Edward Maibach and others, ‘A National Survey of 
Republicans and Republican-Leaning Independents on Energy and Climate Change’ (April 
2013) <http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/files/Republican_Views_on_
Climate_Change.pdf> accessed 28 June 2014.
39 Commission, Special Eurobarometer: Attitudes of EU Citizens Towards Animal Welfare, 
2007; Commission, Attitudes of Consumers Towards the Welfare of Farmed Animals, Wave 
2, 2007.
40 Eg Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals 
kept for farming purposes [1998] OJ L221/23.
41 Eg Council Regulation (EC) 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of ani-
mals during transport and related operations and amending Directives 64/432/EEC and 
93/119/EC and Regulation (EC) 1255/97 [2005] OJ L3/1.
42 Eg Council Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at 
the time of slaughter or killing [1993] OJ L340/21.
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high standards for the farming and slaughter of poultry in the EU, 43 poul-
try meat does not need to undergo any chemical treatment for removing 
bacteria, but is only rinsed with water before being placed on the market. 
EU production does not practise rinsing poultry carcases in substances 
such as chlorine dioxide, acidified sodium chlorite, trisodium phosphate, 
and peroxyacids, and the EU even considers that kind of practice to be 
harmful for human health. In contrast, these chemicals are in common 
use in the US as necessary for preventing the development of bacteria 
and ensuring food safety.44 The EU ban on the imports of poultry treated 
with such chemicals has triggered a trade dispute. Another external con-
sequence of high standards of animal welfare is that EU farming is more 
expensive than that in countries with lower standards.45 In order to pro-
tect that expensive domestic production, the EU has not been willing to 
liberalise its agriculture and open its borders to cheap imports, holding 
back progress in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations. 
The EU is often criticised on the other side of the Atlantic, as its 
strict standards in the field of health, environment and animal welfare 
are perceived as covert protectionism. Many believe that meat treated 
with hormones, GMOs or chlorinated poultry are just as safe as the coun-
terparts of these products which are permitted in the EU. It is perceived 
that the EU authorities should do more to educate the public about the 
safety of the US or Canadian alternatives, and then opinion would be 
more favourable to such goods. Certainly, it would be condemnable if 
these ‘values’ were used for concealing protectionism, and the WTO Panel 
or AB could then determine a breach of obligations. However, in many of 
these European examples it is not clear that protectionism exists or even 
that educating the public could change European views. The fact that 
something does not cause an observable negative effect at this moment 
would often not satisfy EU citizens as it took decades for the effects of cow 
disease or of asbestos fibres on human health to become visible. Precau-
tion is something that the EU authorities often rely on, but this should 
be done in accordance with the WTO rules which apply to this principle.46 
3.2. Regulatory process in the EU
EU strict standards in the field of health, environment and animal 
welfare are also caused by the specificities of the EU regulatory process. 
43 Council Directive 2007/43/EC of 28 June 2007 laying down minimum rules for the 
protection of chickens kept for meat production, [2007] OJ L182/19; Council Directive 
1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying 
hens [1999] OJ L203/53.
44 See Vesilind (n 28) for a comment on the current state of animal welfare in food produc-
tion in the US. 
45 ibid 225-226.
46 See Art 5.7 SPS.
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Namely, it is frequently the case that the EU rule is much stricter than 
the average of Member State rules which existed prior to EU legislation. 
In fact, it is the often the strictest of all Member State rules that becomes 
the EU-wide rule. Basically, EU decision-making turns a ‘regulatory peak’ 
into the EU norm. There are several aspects of EU decision-making that 
bring this about. 
First, the EU Treaties require the EU to ensure high levels of health, 
safety, environmental protection, animal welfare consumer protection, 
etc, when adopting common rules.47 Internal market measures are the 
best examples of how far the EU goes in ensuring these values. Namely, 
Art 114 TFEU provides a legal basis for measures aimed at the establish-
ment and functioning of the internal market. In Tobacco Advertising, the 
Court held that these measures must contribute to the elimination of 
obstacles to the free movement of goods or services or to the removal of 
appreciable distortions of competition.48 However, once the conditions for 
recourse to this legal basis are met, the EU institutions are allowed and 
even required to regulate not only at the minimal level to remove these 
market problems, but at a level which ensures the high protection of 
other values.49 The Court has been very permissive in allowing such strict 
measures. It has even supported measures which caused even worse ob-
stacles to free movement than originally existed without EU legislation. 
Prime examples of this are the BAT case supporting strict tobacco label-
ling rules that prevent a pack of cigarettes from moving between (typi-
cally) more than two Member States;50 and Swedish Match allowing the 
ban of snus.51 Similar is the example of the EU ban of seal products 
which was also adopted on the basis of Art 114 TFEU.52 This ban was 
challenged before the ECJ, but the Court did not go into the merits of 
47 Arts 114(3), 13, 168, 169, 191 TFEU.
48 Case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament & Council [2000] ECR I-8419 (hereinaf-
ter: Tobacco Advertising).
49 ibid para 88.
50 Case C-491/01 The Queen and Secretary of State for health, ex parte: British American 
Tobacco Investments Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd, supported by Japan Tobacco Inc. and 
JT International SA [2002] ECR I-11453. The size of the mandatory warnings on packages 
(general warning having to occupy a minimum of 30% of the most visible surface of the unit 
packet, and the additional warning a minimum of 40% on the other most visible side of the 
packet) and the requirement that the warnings have to be in the official language makes 
it impossible to create a packet with warnings in more than two languages. Consequently, 
each pack has a limited freedom of movement just to states where those languages are the 
official ones. See on this, DA Wyatt and AA Dashwood, European Union Law (5th edn, Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2006) 944-952.
51 Case C-210/03 Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd v. Secretary of State for 
health [2004] ECR I-11893.
52 Regulation (EC) 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Sep-
tember 2009 on trade in seal products [2009] OJ L286/36.
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the case as it found the action inadmissible.53 The ban did lead to a WTO 
dispute, and the EU is required to amend its measure.54
Second, very restrictive common rules can be a consequence of the 
dynamics of decision-making within the Council. It might often be the 
case that a State with more stringent rules can frequently have a better 
bargaining position within the Council than States with lower standards. 
Namely, ‘[s]o long as there is no agreement, its industry is protected from 
foreign competition, while those of its trading partners are hurt by being 
denied access to the market’.55 The strength of a Member State’s bar-
gaining position in the Council will depend on the voting rules and on 
whether its products will be competitive in other States, bearing in mind 
their possibly higher price caused by compliance to higher standards. 
Third, the European Parliament is frequently an important factor in 
pushing for a high level of protection of certain non-trade objectives.56 
The Parliament understands that strict rules lead to obstacles to external 
trade and fewer trade liberalisation benefits, but it frequently does not 
give that much value.57 In many instances leading to international trade 
disputes, it was the Parliament that was the main supporter of a measure 
that became challenged and even found to be in breach of WTO law. For 
example, in the dispute concerning beef treated with growth hormones, 
the Commission wanted to amend EU legislation to make it less restric-
tive and WTO compatible, but it was the Parliament that was against it.58 
Similarly, the Commission had not proposed a total ban of seal products, 
but merely a conditional one which would allow on the EU market seal 
products harvested in a humane way and properly labelled,59 but this 
was amended by the Parliament, turning the measure into a total ban 
53 Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, judgment 
of 3 October 2013.
54 WTO, EC – Seal Products (n 7).
55 AR Young, ‘Incidental Fortress: The Single European Market and the World Trade’ (2004) 
42(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 393, 401, 410.
56 See T Perišin, EU Regulatory Policy and World Trade: Should All EU Institutions Care 
What the World Thinks? (forthcoming).
57 See eg the Parliament’s reasoning on WTO law in ‘I Report on the proposal for a Euro-
pean Parliament and Council directive amending for the seventh time Council Directive 
76/768/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic 
products’ (COM(2000) 189 - C5-0244/2000 - 2000/0077(COD)) Committee on the Environ-
ment, Public Health and Consumer Policy, FINAL A5-0095/2001, 21 March 2001.
58 After the Lamming scientific report that found the use of three relevant natural hor-
mones for growth promotion purposes not to be harmful and that additional tests were 
needed concerning the safety of two synthetic hormones, the Commission proposed a new 
directive which followed such an approach. WTO, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (hormones) – Complainant: US, Panel Report (18 August 1997) WT/DS26/R/USA, 
paras II 28-29.
59 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning 
trade in seals products, 2008/0160 (COD).
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(with two narrow exceptions) which were later challenged both within the 
EU and in the WTO.60 In the case of the Aviation Emissions Directive, it 
was also the Parliament that most strongly opposed a postponement of 
the application of the Directive to flights to and from the EU.61 The Parlia-
ment was also the proponent of not allowing nano-technology in food,62 
etc. One might argue that these are populist measures responding to 
some concerns of EU voters who are not necessarily informed about all 
the pros and cons of the measure at issue. Zigler argued on this point 
that the regulatory difference between the EU and the US also arises as 
a consequence of the fact that the regulation of health, environment and 
animal welfare in the EU is in the hands of politicians, and in the US it is 
mostly done by regulatory agencies such as the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).63 
Fourth, the EU is aware that it can export its health, environmental 
or animal welfare standard. While these standards are primarily adopted 
to serve an internal policy, they have incidental external effects which 
can trigger the export of standards (the ‘Brussels effect’64). There are 
three main ways in which the export of standards can occur. One is de 
facto when producers in third countries start complying with such EU 
standards. This has happened with EU standards on beef hormones. The 
EU lost the case in the WTO, but it has not abandoned its measure. The 
long-term effect after many years was that the US and Canadian farm-
ers adjusted their production and gained better conditions for imports 
of ‘high quality beef’ into the EU.65 The second type of export of stand-
60 For an overview of the Seal Products Regulation’s legislative history, see Ferdi de Ville, 
‘Explaining the Genesis of a Trade Dispute: The European Union’s Seal Trade Ban’ (2012) 
34 Journal of European Integration 37.
61 EurActiv, ‘MEPs Defy EU States on Aviation Emissions Law’ (31 January 2014) <www.
euractiv.com/transport/parliament-defies-european-counc-news-533156> accessed 3 
April 2014; EurActiv, ‘Kallas: Global Aviation Emissions Talks “A Nightmare”’ (7 March 
2014) <www.euractiv.com/transport/kallas-calls-global-talks-aviati-news-533967> ac-
cessed 3 April 2014, citing German MEP Pieter Liese.
62 Euractiv (n 15). 
63 Oliver Ziegler, ‘EU-US Regulatory Coordination. A Two-level Game Approach’ (2009) FRP 
Working Paper 04/09, 5 <http://www.regensburger-politikwissenschaftler.de/frp_work-
ing_paper_04_2009.pdf> accessed 28 June 2014.
64 Marise Cremona, ‘The Single Market as a Global Export Brand’ (2010) 21 EBL Rev 663; 
Anu Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) 107 NWUL Rev 1; Chad Damro, ‘Market Power 
Europe’ (2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy 682; Joanne Scott, ‘Extraterritorial-
ity and Territorial Extension in EU Law’ (2014) 62 AJCL 87; Alasdair R Young, ‘Europe As 
a Global Regulator? The Limits of EU Influence in International Food Safety Standards’ 
(2014) 21 Journal of European Public Policy 904; Sandra Lavenex, ‘The Power of Function-
alist Extension: How EU Rules Travel’ (2014) 21 Journal of European Public Policy 885.
65 Memoranda of Understanding between the United States of America / Canada and the 
European Commission Regarding the Importation of Beef from Animals Not Treated with 
Certain Growth-Promoting Hormones and Increased Duties Applied by the United States to 
Certain Products of the EC, WT/DS26/28, 30 September 2009 / WT/DS48/26, 22 March 
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ards occurs when third countries follow the EU model and adopt similar 
rules (de iure export at national levels). For example, the Seal Products 
Regulation was accompanied by this type of export of standards in the 
sense that the EU led by example, and several other countries followed 
suit.66 The third type of export happens when a global standard-setting 
body adopts the EU standard as its own (de iure export at international 
level). The example of this might be rules on aviation emissions if the EU 
standard (or a standard close to it) are adopted at the international level 
within the International Civil Aviation Organization. The EU rule (which 
is temporarily suspended) would require all flights to and from the EU 
to pay allowances for the emissions released on the entire flight. Under 
the pressure of that measure being applied to non-EU aircrafts, the last 
ICAO General Assembly agreed that the ICAO would start developing a 
global system of market-based measures so as to make a decision on it 
at its next meeting in 2016, and implementation should start in 2020.67
4. Addressing regulatory diversion 
Regulatory divergence presents a trade barrier, regardless of the fact 
whether different national laws are lawful or not. Thus, regulatory diver-
gence is positive only if this is a reflection of the different interests or val-
ues of its constituencies. In most cases, however, regulatory divergence 
does not occur because people of different constituencies have different 
priorities, but merely because their respective regulators do not commu-
nicate when setting standards. For example, car manufacturers are un-
able to produce a ‘world car’ ie a vehicle that could be marketed without 
any change all over the world, and this is not only because of differing 
consumer preferences, but because of accidental regulatory divergence. 
Two large automobile markets, the EU and the US, have different rules 
on the emission of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and other green-
house gasses, some being stricter on one side of the Atlantic, and some 
on the other.68 
2011; Regulation (EU) No 464/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 May 2012 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 617/2009 opening an autonomous 
tariff quota for imports of high-quality beef [2012] OJ L 149/1.
66 Pravda, ‘Russia Bans Harp Seal Trade. Next Stop, Canada!’ <english.pravda.ru/opinion/
columnists/21-12-2011/120030-russia_seals-0/> accessed 3 April 2014.
67 ICAO Resolution A38-18: Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and prac-
tices related to environmental protection – Climate change (November 2013), particularly 
Art 19.
68 For EU standards on pollutant emissions from light vehicles, see <http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/environment/air_pollution/l28186_en.htm>; for US standards on 
these emissions see <http://www.epa.gov/otaq/standards/light-duty/> both accessed 28 
June 2014.
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Over the last couple of decades, there has been a lot of effort and 
a number of agreements aimed at removing regulatory differences on 
the two sides of the Atlantic. Some of the effort to remove regulatory 
trade barriers is happening with the WTO, eg through the SPS commit-
tee where each member has to notify other members of a planned SPS 
measure, and these other WTO members have a chance to voice their 
positions.69  There is also a number of bilateral instruments which seek 
to serve this purpose. The EU and the US have in force the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership70 which is accompanied by documents such as the 
Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency,71 and the insti-
tutional mechanism of the Transatlantic Economic Council and a num-
ber of other soft mechanisms for promoting regulatory convergence.72 
Similarly, the EU and Canada have adopted a Framework on Regulatory 
Cooperation and Transparency73 promoting voluntary regulatory coop-
eration, as well as some sectoral agreements.74 
Most recently, there has been an agenda of removing obstacles to 
transatlantic trade arising from regulatory divergence through more ex-
tensive trade agreements. The EU and Canada are at an advanced stage 
of negotiating the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement.75 And 
in 2013, the EU and the US started negotiations on the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership. Most documents concerning these 
agreements are kept confidential,76 but we do know that the elimination 
69 Art 7 and Annex B SPS; J Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (Oxford University Press 2007) 57-58.
70 Transatlantic Economic Partnership, <ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/
files/trans_econ_partner_11_98_en.pdf> accessed 3 April 2014.
71 Guidelines on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency, <ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
policies/international/files/guidelines3_en.pdf> accessed 3 April 2014.
72 Eg one of the first efforts in this respect was the Joint US-EU Statement on Early Warn-
ing and Problem Prevention Principles and Mechanisms, adopted in 1999. See <http://
ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-governments/usa/regulatory-
cooperation/index_en.htm> accessed 28 June 2014. 
73 Government of Canada – European Commission Framework on Regulatory Co-Oper-
ation and Transparency <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/files/
f1994_en.pdf> accessed 28 June 2014.
74 Eg Veterinary Equivalence Agreement – Agreement between the European Community 
and the Government of Canada on sanitary measures to protect public and animal health 
in respect of trade in live animals and animal products [1999] OJ  L71/3.
75 On CETA, see James Mathis, ‘Multilateral Aspects of Advanced Regulatory Cooperation: 
Considerations for a Canada-EU Comprehensive Trade Agreement (CETA)’ (2012) 39 Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 73, 77; Stanko S Krstic, ‘Regulatory Cooperation to Remove 
Non-tariff Barriers to Trade in Products: Key Challenges and Opportunities for the Canada-
EU Comprehensive Trade Agreement (CETA)’ (2012) 39 Legal Issues of Economic Integra-
tion 3.
76 Documents relating to the negotiation of international agreements might become more 
accessible following the recent ruling of the CJEU where it upheld a decision of the Gen-
eral Court stating that the Council erred in denying a Member of the European Parliament 
access to a document connected to an international agreement. C-350/12 P  Council v 
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of non-tariff barriers to trade arising from regulatory divergence is on the 
agenda of both negotiations. There are two main issues here. 
On the one hand, there is the question of which regulatory differ-
ences should be removed and which should be respected as arising from 
true differences in the legitimate aims of two polities. It would not be 
difficult to achieve political support for the elimination of trade barriers 
in cases where regulatory divergence is a mere consequence of the inde-
pendent work of regulatory bodies in the sense that their rules achieve 
the same aims, but as no consultations have taken place, the way of 
achieving this aim is different. Most regulatory divergence is of this type. 
EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht stated that if one ‘take[s] a broader 
view on regulatory issues[, the EU and the US] want the same thing in the 
end: a high level of protection for our people from risks to their health, 
safety, financial security and environment’, and he argued that, for ex-
ample, while seatbelts in the EU and the US might be differently regu-
lated, they are equally safe.77 In contrast, different rules on GMOs are not 
accidental, but the EU sees them as pursuing legitimate aims and does 
not seem willing to remove them despite possible advantages if it did so 
for consumer choice (as there certainly would be consumers who would 
opt for a cheaper product regardless of its genetic properties). Some have 
argued that the TTIP will not be adopted if it sets a too ambitious goal, 
such as the removal of such trade barriers. Lester has argued that the 
TTIP only stands a chance of being adopted if it concentrates solely on 
‘low-hanging fruit’.78 However, there are political actors who consider that 
without addressing this barrier to the movement of GMOs, the US should 
drop the whole agreement. Max Bauchus, a Democrat, who was at the 
time a US senator from Montana, an agricultural state, wrote in the Fi-
nancial Times that the US Congress should not support the agreement if 
the EU did not remove obstacles to the exports of US GM crops, and beef 
and pork fed with additives currently banned in the EU.79
In ‘t Veld, judgment of 3 July 2014; Euractiv, ‘Les documents du TTIP peuvent être pub-
liés, selon la Cour de justice européenne’ (4 July 2014) <http://www.euractiv.fr/sections/
euro-finances/les-documents-du-ttip-peuvent-etre-publies-selon-la-cour-de-justice?utm_
source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign=a270e62653-newsletter_derni%C3%A8res_
infos&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_da6c5d4235-a270e62653-55406953> accessed 4 
July 2014.
77 Karel De Gucht, ‘A European Perspective on Transatlantic Free Trade’ (Speech at the 
European Conference at Harvard Kennedy School: Europe 2.0: Taking the Next Step, Cam-
bridge, USA, 2 March 2013)  <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-178_
en.htm> accessed 15 July 2014.
78 Simon Lester and Inu Barbee, ‘The Challenge of Cooperation: Regulatory Trade Barriers 
in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’ (2013) 16 Journal of International 
Economic Law 847, 849.
79 Max Baucus, ‘Transatlantic Trade Deal Is a US priority’ Financial Times (London, 4 
March 2013).
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On the other hand, the question is how to remove the non-tariff 
barriers, ie through which mechanism. There is a number of theoretical 
possibilities, ranging from negative integration, ie deregulation requiring 
countries not to apply their standards to imports, to positive integra-
tion, ie reregulation where common rules would be set. The TTIP has 
been criticised, among other things, because it is based on an economic 
analysis which calculates the benefits for both markets arising from the 
elimination of non-tariff trade barriers without addressing how that is to 
be achieved.80 CETA is also not clear on that point, although official docu-
ments explicitly refer to recognition in some areas such as automotive 
standards and qualifications.81 It is thus worth examining the theoreti-
cally available possibilities. 
The first option is the conditional mutual recognition of standards, 
such as the ones that exist in the EU between Member States. Within 
the EU, this type of mutual recognition requires any product lawfully 
produced and marketed in one Member State to be allowed in another 
Member State unless there is a justified reason for denying market ac-
cess. The national regulatory autonomy of each member is limited in a 
way that a member can only exceptionally require foreign products to 
comply with its own standards. This is broader than the requirement of 
equivalence which already exists in the WTO concerning SPS standards 
and is encouraged by the TBT.82 Equivalence is a 
case-based… finding that the home or exporting country regula-
tion is equivalent – in the sense of satisfying the regulatory goal – 
to the host or importing country regulation. Mutual recognition, 
on the other hand, involves broad and automatic recognition of 
foreign regulation, without case-based evaluation.83 
Such a mechanism of removing trade barriers is politically accept-
able only in a very homogeneous setting and/or if the general aims of 
the agreement are very ambitious (eg economic and social cohesion in 
Europe, peace, etc). The North Atlantic sphere is quite homogeneous in 
80 See Ferdi De Ville and Gabriel Siles-Brügge, ‘The EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership and the Role of Trade Impact Assessments: Managing Fictional Expecta-
tions’ (Paper presented at the 55th International Studies Association Annual Convention, 
Toronto, 26-29 March, 2014).
81 Commission, ‘Memo: Facts and Figures of the EU-Canada Free Trade Deal’ (18 October 
2013) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-911_en.htm> accessed 15 July 
2014.
82 Art 4 SPS; Art 2.7 TBT.
83 JP Trachtman, ‘Embedding Mutual Recognition at the WTO’ (2007) 14 Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy 780, 784. See also JHH Weiler, ‘Mutual Recognition, Functional Equiva-
lence and Harmonization in the Evolution of the European Common Market and the WTO’ 
in F Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (ed), The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the European Inte-
gration Process (Palgrave 2005).
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comparison to the rest of the world, but there is a question of political 
feasibility whether the parties could aim for the elimination of the re-
maining differences in this way. Many fear that mutual recognition of 
standards would lead to the downgrading of standards.84 However, in 
arguing that point, it is often forgotten that mutual recognition of this 
type is conditional, ie that each country can prevent market access for 
imported goods if it has a legitimate aim and if it is pursuing that aim 
in a proportionate manner. Of course, the question here arises as to who 
would be the arbiter on whether an aim is a legitimate one, and whether 
the measure is proportionate (and what type of proportionality analysis is 
required). But even in the absence of any arbiter, one would expect that 
both trading partners would be aware that if they started invoking the 
exception recklessly, the other party would start doing the same and this 
would hurt both economies and undermine the entire agreement. It is 
theoretically possible that regulatory competition would work in the way 
that each trading partner would want to have less strict standards so as 
to keep production on its territory. However, that depends on whether a 
product complying with the higher standard would still be competitive on 
the market. The EU’s example of regulating non-elastic markets, ie goods 
that can be placed on the market, instead of regulating production has 
proven successful in this respect. A producer wishing to place his prod-
ucts on the EU market has to conform to its standards regardless of where 
the production takes place. There is thus no incentive to move produc-
tion elsewhere so as to avoid compliance with the EU standard. The EU 
has even managed in a number of cases to export its strict standards to 
other countries, frequently just de facto because foreign producers have 
adjusted their production to the EU standards (the ‘Brussels effect’).85 
The second theoretical option is a less intrusive type of mutual rec-
ognition where countries do not recognise each other’s standards, but 
their conformity assessment procedures. This type of mutual recognition 
is already quite apparent on a global scale. WTO law requires members to 
ensure, whenever possible, that results of conformity assess-
ment procedures in other Members are accepted, even when 
those procedures differ from their own, provided they are satis-
fied that those procedures offer an assurance of conformity with 
applicable technical regulations or standards equivalent to their 
own procedures.86 
WTO law also stimulates Member States to conclude agreements on 
mutual recognition of the results of their conformity assessment proce-
84 See De Ville and Gabriel Siles-Brügge (n 80) 2.
85 Bradford (n 64).
86 Art 6.1 TBT.
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dures (MRAs),87 and many countries have done so. However, as Mathis 
explains, initial enthusiasm about the trade liberalising potential of this 
instrument which existed after the WTO was set up quickly subsided:88 
The painstaking process of certifying conformity assessment 
bodies across product sectors – one product and sector at a time 
– tended to demonstrate that the MRA mechanism was too cum-
bersome and too slow to achieve the kind of recognition results 
sought by the economic actors who understand how product 
standards and testing procedures functioned as non-tariff barri-
ers in their important markets.89 
Thus, the new comprehensive trade agreements, such as those be-
tween the EU and Canada, or between the EU and the US, will certainly 
aim to go beyond this type of MRA.
The third option is some sort of harmonisation by setting common 
standards. WTO law provides for some ‘building up’ in the sense that it 
encourages international standardisation. However, true harmonisation 
where common rules replace previously existing national rules requires 
a complex institutional set-up, either in the form of common institutions 
(as those that exist at the EU level) or intensive and continuous coopera-
tion between two regulators (such as that which occurs, for example, in 
an EU candidate country before EU accession through the cooperation 
of the candidate country’s and EU institutions). The first option of creat-
ing common institutions does not seem a probable agenda for a bilateral 
trade agreement. The second option of envisaging closer cooperation be-
tween domestic regulators is more likely. However, if each of the parties 
had a larger number of such bilateral agreements where its domestic in-
stitutions were required to work closely with those of its trading partners, 
the system would be difficult to maintain.90
It is also possible that the agreements could have a sectoral ap-
proach so that different methods of removing trade barriers would be 
used in different areas. For example, the EU TTIP negotiating position 
for motor vehicles states that mutual recognition is the aim, and that 
this could be gradually achieved.91 The first steps could be recognition of 
equivalence of regulations, focusing on the fact that they bring about an 
equivalent outcome, ie the same level of safety, environmental protection, 
87 Art 6.3 TBT.
88 Mathis (n 75) 77.
89 ibid.
90 ibid 91.
91 Commission, ‘Towards an EU-US Trade Deal. Making Trade Work For You’. The Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Regulatory Issues: EU Position on Motor Ve-
hicles (14 May 2014) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152467.
pdf> accessed 7 July 2014, p 1.
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etc.92 This would be accompanied by closer cooperation in areas where 
there is no equivalence so as to create common rules.93 The field of motor 
vehicles might be specific due to the fact that there are existing agree-
ments in this field, so other areas might require a different approach. 
5. Conclusion
The EU on the one hand and the US and Canada on the other have 
a different level of risk aversion when it comes to risks to health, environ-
ment and animal welfare. The EU is more risk averse and adopts stricter 
rules to ensure a higher level of health, environment and animal welfare 
protection. This has created a number of obstacles to transatlantic trade 
and has led to WTO and other trade disputes.
Existing agreements which sought to address regulatory divergence, 
either within the framework of the WTO or separate bilateral instruments, 
have only achieved limited success. Currently negotiated comprehensive 
trade agreements, CETA and TTIP, also seek to enhance trade by remov-
ing non-tariff barriers caused by regulatory divergence. One cannot ob-
ject to the removal of regulatory divergence which is a merely accidental 
consequence of the fact that regulators in two systems work indepen-
dently of one another. However, in cases where there are true differences 
in the aims and values of two societies, regulatory divergence is positive 
from the perspective of diversity, pluralism, experimentation and democ-
racy. Obstacles arising from such regulatory choices probably cannot 
and should not be removed by international agreements such as CETA 
or TTIP. It takes political effort, good surveys and intellectual honesty to 
selectively pin down which obstacles are of this latter type and ought to 
be maintained. Concerning the method of removing trade barriers, each 
of the possible mechanisms can politically and practically be difficult 
to achieve. While the equivalence and mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment procedures are already envisaged by WTO law, but do not 
do enough, and while harmonisation would be politically and practically 
most difficult and would (arguably) do too much, conditional mutual rec-
ognition of standards seems to impose itself as the middle way. Whether 
this mechanism of removing non-tariff trade barriers will be adopted in 
CETA and TTIP depends on how homogeneous the political actors see the 
North Atlantic space, and how far are they willing to take their relations. 
92 ibid 1-2.
93 ibid 1, 3.
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